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ABSTRACT 
 
The Welfare Effects of Globalization 
with Labor Market Regulation 
 
I examine how globalization affects wages and welfare in a general equilibrium model of 
international trade with partly oligopolistic markets. Globalization is modeled as reducing 
trade costs or opening up shielded sectors to trade. There is a national or international 
common agency that determines minimum wages for the oligopolists, either directly or 
through supporting labor unions. The lobbies of employers and labor unions influence that 
agency, relating their prospective political contributions to the latter’s decisions. Both a shift 
from national to international regulation and a decrease in trade costs promote aggregate 
welfare, but decrease open-sector relative wages. 
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1. Introduction
In modern economies, the wages are in general determined by a complex
political process in which the employers and labor unions on the one hand,
and the governments and authorities regulating the labor market on the
other hand play a crucial role. Given this process, I explore the effects of
international economic integration on wages and aggregate welfare.
The traditional way of considering globalization analyzes the impact of
trade cost reductions or opening up to trade on bargained wages through the
elasticity of labor demand. Huizinga (1993) and Driffill and Vander Ploeg
(1995) claim that the integration of markets increase the elasticity of labor
demand, decreasing bargained wages. Naylor (1998,1999) indicates the op-
posite. Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009) as well as Kreickemeier and Meland
(2013) combine Neary’s (2009) general oligopolistic equilibrium model with
unionized labor markets, repeating Naylor’s conclusion. All these articles,
however, assume that relative union bargaining power is wholly exogenous
(e.g. monopoly unions). In this article, I assume that labor market regulation
is a political process that determines union power endogenously.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence on changing union power. Union-
ization has declined in most OECD countries since the 1980s (Nickell et al.
2005, pp. 6-7). In particular, in the years 1975-2000, labor markets have been
rapidly deregulated in the US and UK (Acemoglu et al. 2001). Globalization
has undermined union bargaining power (cf. Abraham et al. 2009, Dumont
at al. 2006, 2012, Boulhol et al. 2011). Protection of regular employment
contracts was diminished when globalization was proceeding rapidly (Po-
trafke 2010). Given this evidence, it is instructive to consider relative union
bargaining power as endogenous in a model of international trade.
The political economy can be modeled either by majority voting (cf.
Saint-Paul 2002a, 2002b), all-pay auctioning, in which the lobbyist making
the greater effort wins with certainty (cf. Johal and Ulph 2002), or menu ac-
tioning, in which the lobbyists announce their bids contingent on the policy
maker’s actions (cf. Dixit et al 1997). With all-pay auctioning, lobbying ex-
penditures are incurred by all the lobbyists before the policy maker takes an
action. This is the case e.g. when interest groups spend money to increase
the probability of getting their favorite type of government elected. With
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menu auctioning, it is not possible for a lobbyist to spend money and effort
on lobbying without getting what he lobbied for. Because menu auction-
ing fits best for the case where employers and labor unions obtain marginal
improvements for their position by lobbying, I take it as a starting point.
Using the political economy model of menu auctioning, Palokangas (2003)
shows that distorting taxation can cause labor market regulation: if employ-
ers and workers bargain over wages and lobby the government over taxation
and labor market regulation, and if it is much easier to tax wages than prof-
its, then the government has incentives to protect union power. Palokangas
(2014) shows that an increase in the number of common agencies tend to
decrease union power in an economy with R&D-based growth.
The main idea of this article is the following. While monopoly unions set
wages to maximize the workers’ rents, the political economy of labor market
regulation results in wages that maximize the workers’ and employers’ to-
tal rents. Consequently, globalization tends to decrease open-sector relative
wages and aggregate welfare in the case of monopoly unions (cf. Kreicke-
meier and Meland 2013), but to increase those in the case of labor market
regulation. I organize the remainder of this article as follows. The structure
of the economy is presented in section 2. The specific models of the house-
holds, firms and labor markets are constructed in 3 and 4. A common agency
game where employers and labor unions lobby common agencies is presented
in 5. The political equilibrium of that game is established in 6. Finally, the
general equilibrium and welfare effects of globalization are considered in 7.
2. The economy
There are two identical countries, home and foreign, that possess a fixed
amount L of labor and a “continuum” of sectors i ∈ [0, 1]. Each sector
i produces one unit of a separate good i from one unit of labor. As in
Brander and Krugman (1983), there are segmented markets and a specific
unit tariff τ > 0 for traded goods. Because this tariff characterizes implicit
trade barriers, following Kreickemeier and Meland (2013), I assume that tariff
revenues from foreign firms accrue to home employers only, for simplicity.
The sectors i ∈ [0, 1] can be divided into three distinct sets: competitive
sectors M , open (and oligopolistic) sectors P producing traded goods, and
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shielded (and oligopolistic) sectors S producing non-traded goods.1 The
masses of open, shielded and competitive sectors are constants (α, β, γ):
∫
i∈M
di = γ,
∫
i∈P
di = α,
∫
i∈S
di = β = 1− γ − α. (1)
All oligopolistic sectors i ∈ P∪S = [0, 1]\M contain the same given number n
of oligopolistic firms. The tariff τ > 0 prevents any trade of the competitive
goods i ∈ M between the two identical countries. Opening up shielded
sectors to trade is equivalent to increasing α with an equal decrease in β.
Denoting the demand for labor in sector by l(i) and the variables associated
with the foreign country by superscript (∗), the equilibrium conditions of the
labor markets can be written as follows:
L =
∫ 1
0
l(i)di, L = L∗ =
∫ 1
0
l∗(i)di. (2)
I assume that there is a common agency (e.g. a government or some other
authority) that determines the (national or international) minimum wages
for the oligopolistic sectors i ∈ P ∪ S. The unions and employers influence
this by their political contributions. In Appendix A, I extend the results for
the case where the common agency do not set the minimum wages directly,
but supports labor unions that bargain with oligopolists over the wages.
The political equilibrium is established by the common agency model
(c.f. Bernheim and Whinston 1986 and Dixit et al. 1997). The agents are
households, firms, union and employer lobbies, and common agencies. Their
decisions form an extensive form game as follows:
(i) The employer and union lobbies influence the common agency, relating
their prospective political contributions to the latter’s decisions.
1This structure follows Kreickemeier and Meland (2013), but with the following excep-
tion. The competitive sectors in the model of this article provide a reservation wage for
labor unions. KM introduce non-unionized (but oligopolistic) sectors into their model for
the same purpose, but assuming exogenous union power. Because union power is deter-
mined by political process in this article, it would be implausible to assume that union
power is allowed in some, but not in the other sectors. If there is no union in a sector,
then the best explanation is that there are no rents to be bargained over.
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(ii) The common agency sets wages for the oligopolistic sectors i ∈ P ∪ S,
and collects political contributions.
(iii) The competitive wage wm adjusts to balance the labor market.
(iv) The firms employ labor.
(v) The households decide on consumption.
This game is solved by backward induction: stage (v) is examined in section
3, stages (iv) and (iii) in 4, stage (ii) in 5 and stage (i) in 6. At each stage, I
consider the behavior of home agents, but because the countries are identical,
the foreign agents behave in the same manner.
3. The households
Following Neary (2009), I assume that the representative home household
derives utility U from the consumption c(i) of the goods i ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
u
.
=
∫ 1
0
[
ac(i)− b
2
c(i)2
]
di, (3)
where a and b are positive constants. Denoting income by I and the price
for good i by p(i), the home budget constraint can be written as follows:
I =
∫ 1
0
p(i)c(i)di. (4)
The maximization of utility (3) by consumption c(i) subject to the budget
constraint (4) leads to the inverse demand functions p(i) = [a − bc(i)]/λ,
where λ is the marginal utility of income. Following Neary (2009), I normalize
λ at one. The inverse demand functions take then the form
p(i) = a− bc(i). (5)
The index of the prices (5) is given by
µ1
.
=
∫ 1
0
p(i)di = a− b
∫ 1
0
c(i)di. (6)
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Because one unit of each good i is produced from one unit of labor, consump-
tion
∫ 1
0
[c(i) + c∗(i)]di must be equal to employment
∫ 1
0
[l(i) + l∗(i)]di = 2L in
the two countries taken together [cf. (2)]. Because the countries are identical,
then, c∗(i) = c(i) and
∫ 1
0
c(i)di = L hold true in equilibrium, and it follows
from (6) that the price index µ1 = a− bL is constant in equilibrium.
Plugging the direct demands c(i) = [a − p(i)]/b [cf. (5)] into the budget
constraint (4) and the utility function (3) yields the uncentred variance of
prices, µ2, and indirect utility as follows:
µ2
.
=
∫ 1
0
p(i)2di = aµ1 − bI, u = a
2
2b
− µ2
2b
=
a2
2b
− aµ1
2b
+
I
2
.
Because utility u depends linearly on I only, income I can be used as a proxy
for utility u at all levels of aggregation.
4. Production
I assume that the home agency can set different wages wp and ws for
the open and shielded sectors, respectively. In Appendix A, the results are
generalized for the case of collective bargaining with labor unions.
4.1. Shielded sectors i ∈ S
Consumption c(i) equals employment l(i) in shielded sectors:
c(i) = l(i) =
n∑
j=1
lj(i) for i ∈ S, (7)
where lj(i) is the labor input of firm j. Noting the inverse demand function
(5) and technology (7), the profit of home firm j can be written as follows:
pij(i)
.
= [p(i)− ws]lj(i) =
[
a− b
n∑
κ=1
lκ(i)− ws
]
lj(i) for i ∈ S. (8)
Home firm j maximizes profit (8) by its input lj(i), given the wage w(i) and
the inputs of the other firms,
∑n
κ6=j lκ(i). Cournot competition between the
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n identical firms yields
c(i) = cs = l(i) = ls = nlj(i) =
n(a− ws)
(n+ 1)b
and p(i) = ps =
a+ nws
n+ 1
for i ∈ S. (9)
4.2. Open sectors i ∈ P
The employment of home firm j equals its output for the home markets,
xj(i), and that for the foreign markets, yj(i):
lj(i) = xj(i) + yj(i) for i ∈ P . (10)
The consumption of good i ∈ P , c(i), equals the home production of that
good, xj(i), plus imports from abroad, y
∗
j (i):
c(i) =
n∑
κ=1
[xκ(i) + y
∗
κ(i)] for i ∈ P . (11)
Noting the inverse demand function (5) and technology (10) and (11), the
profit of home firm j can be written as follows:
pij(i)
.
= [p(i)− wp]xj(i) + [p∗(i)− wp − τ ]yj(i)
=
{
a− b
n∑
κ=1
[xκ(i) + y
∗
κ(i)]− wp
}
xj(i)
+
{
a− b
n∑
κ=1
[x∗κ(i) + yκ(i)]− wp − τ
}
yj(i) for i ∈ P . (12)
Home firm j in sector i ∈ P maximizes its profit (12) by its inputs xj(i)
and yj(i), given the wage wp and the inputs of the other firms, xκ(i) and
yκ(i) for κ 6= j and x∗κ(i) and y∗κ(i) for j ∈ [0, 1]. Foreign firm j in that sector
behaves accordingly, given the others’ inputs and the foreign open-sector
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wage w∗p.
2 Kreickemeier and Meland (2013) prove that if the tariff τ is low
enough for having trade in the open sectors, there is Cournot competition
between n identical home and n identical foreign firms, where the latter have
higher effective (trade-cost inclusive) marginal cost. This competition yields
y(i) = y = nyj(i) = n
a− (n+ 1)(wp + τ) + nw∗p
(2n+ 1)b
for i ∈ P ,
y∗(i) = y∗ = ny∗j (i) = n
a− (n+ 1)(w∗p + τ) + nwp
(2n+ 1)b
for i ∈ P ,
y∗ − y = n
b
(wp − w∗p), (13)
l(i) = lp = n[xj(i) + yj(i)] = n
2[a+ nw∗p − (n+ 1)wp]− τ
(2n+ 1)b
,
c(i) = c∗(i) = cp = n[xj(i) + y∗j (i)] = n
2a− wp − w∗p − τ
(2n+ 1)b
and
p∗(i) = p(i) = pp =
1
2n+ 1
{
(n+ 1)a+ n(wp + w
∗
p + τ)
}
for i ∈ P . (14)
4.3. Competitive sectors i ∈M
In the competitive sectors, the prices equal the competitive wage wm,
and, because the tariff τ > 0 prevents trade between the identical countries,
home consumption c(i) equals home output l(i) [cf. (5)]:
p(i) = wm and lm = l(i) = c(i) =
a− p(i)
b
=
a− wm
b
for i ∈M . (15)
Given (1), (14) and (15), the full-employment constraint (2) takes the form
L =
∫
i∈M
l(i)di+
∫
i∈S
l(i)di+
∫
i∈P
l(i)di = αlp + βls + γlm. (16)
2This is equivalent to the reciprocal dumping model of Brander and Krugman (1983).
Exports occur if and only if the tariff τ is below a critical level that is implicitly given by
the condition that effective marginal cost of serving the export market, wp + τ , equals the
price in this market in the absence of trade, (a+nwp)]/(n+ 1), which is also the marginal
revenue of the exporting firm for the first unit sold abroad.
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Solving for wm from this and noting (9) and (14), one obtains the competitive
wage that clears the labor market:
wm = a− blm = a+ b
γ
(αlp + βls − L)
= a− b
γ
L+
α
γ
n
2[a+ nw∗p − (n+ 1)wp]− τ
2n+ 1
+
β
γ
n
a− ws
n+ 1
. (17)
5. Lobbies and the common agency
Noting (8), (12) and (14), one can obtain the employers’ sectorial rents
pi(i) =
{ ∑n
j=1 pij(i) = [p(i)− wp]l(i)− τy(i) for i ∈ P ,∑n
j=1 pij(i) = [p(i)− ws]l(i) for i ∈ S,
(18)
and the workers’ sectorial rents over and above the competitive wage wm,
v(i) = [w(i)− wm]l(i) for i ∈ P ∪ S. (19)
The tariff revenues from foreign firms, τ
∫
i∈P y
∗(i)di, accrue the home em-
ployers only. Given this, (1), (4), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18) and (19), total
income I and the employers’ and workers’ total rents, Π and W , become
I = ppcp + pscs + pmcm, (20)
Π(ws, wp, w
∗
p, τ, α)
.
=
∫
i∈P∪S
pi(i)di+ τ
∫
i∈P
y∗(i)di
= α(pp − wp)lp + β(ps − ws)ls + ατ(y∗ − y)
= α(pp − wp)lp + β(ps − ws)ls + αn
b
τ(wp − w∗p), (21)
W (ws, wp, w
∗
p, τ, α)
.
=
∫ 1
0
v(i)di = α(wp − wm)lp + β(ws − wm)ls. (22)
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I assume that all unions belong to the same lobby, for convenience.3 The
union lobby attempts to maximize the workers’ rents W minus its political
contributions RW , IW
.
= W − RW , while the employer lobby attempts to
maximize the employers’ rents Π minus its political contributions RΠ to the
common agency, IΠ
.
= Π− RΠ. Following Dixit et al. (1997), I assume that
the common agency’s utility G is an increasing function of the utilities of
both lobbies, IW and IΠ, and the total contributions RP +RW it receive:
IW (ws, wp, w
∗
p, τ, α,RW )
.
= W −RW , IΠ(ws, wp, w∗p, τ, α,RΠ) .= Π−RΠ,
G(IW , IΠ, RW +RΠ),
∂G
∂IW
> 0,
∂G
∂IΠ
> 0,
∂G
∂(RW +RΠ)
> 0. (23)
Following Dixit (1986), I assume that the home agency and the home
lobbies anticipate their foreign counterparts to follow their choice of the open-
sector wage wp according to the conjectural variation relation
dw∗p
dwp
= ϕ ∈ {0, 1}. (24)
This a way of incorporating national labor market regulation (ϕ = 0), in
which the home and foreign agencies behave in Cournot manner, taking each
other’s wages as given, and international labor market regulation (ϕ = 1) in
which the countries have the same common agency, into the same model.
6. Political Equilibrium
According to Dixit et al. (1997), a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
for the game between the employer lobby, the union lobby and the common
agency is a set of contribution schedules RΠ(ws, wp, w
∗
p) and RW (ws, wp, w
∗
p)
and policy (ws, wp) that satisfy the following conditions (i)− (iv):
3Because the workers’ and employers’ rents, (22) and (18), are additive over the open
and shielded sectors, the results would be the same even if the unions and employers had
separate lobbies in the open and shielded sectors, provided that tariff revenues from foreign
firms, τ
∫
i∈P y
∗(i)di, accrue the home open-sector employers only.
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(i) The contributions of the lobbies, RΠ and RW , are non-negative but no
more than the contributor’s income.
(ii) With a feasible strategy RΠ(ws, wp, w
∗
p)
(
RW (ws, wp, w
∗
p)
)
, the employer
(labor) lobby maximizes its utility IΠ (IW ) by wages (ws, wp) s.t. (24):
(ws, wp) = arg max
(ws, wp) s.t. (24)
IΠ(ws, wp, w
∗
p, τ, α,RΠ),
(ws, wp) = arg max
(ws, wp) s.t. (24)
IW (ws, wp, w
∗
p, τ, α,RW ). (25)
(iii) Wages (ws, wp) maximize the agency’s welfare (23) s.t. (24) [cf. (25)]:
(ws, wp) = arg max
(ws, wp)
s.t. (24)
G
(
max
(ws, wp)
s.t. (24)
IΠ, max
(ws, wp)
s.t. (24)
IW , RΠ +RW
)
= arg max
(ws, wp) s.t. (24)
[
RΠ(ws, wp, w
∗
p) +RW (ws, wp, w
∗
p)
]
.
(26)
(iv) The employer (labor) lobby provides the common agency at least with
the level of utility than in the case where it offers nothing RW = 0
(RΠ = 0), and where the common agency responds optimally given the
other lobby’s contribution function RΠ(ws, wp, w
∗
p)
(
RW (ws, wp, w
∗
p)
)
.
The equilibrium conditions (25) are equivalent to [cf. (23)]
0 =
∂IΠ
∂wp
+
∂IΠ
∂w∗p
dw∗p
dwp
− ∂IΠ
∂RΠ
∂RΠ
∂wp
=
∂Π
∂wp
+
∂Π
∂w∗p
ϕ− ∂Rκ
∂wp
,
0 =
∂IΠ
∂ws
− ∂IΠ
∂RΠ
∂RΠ
∂ws
=
∂Π
∂ws
− ∂Rκ
∂ws
,
0 =
∂IW
∂wp
+
∂IW
∂w∗p
dw∗p
dwp
− ∂IW
∂RW
∂RW
∂wp
=
∂W
∂wp
+
∂W
∂w∗p
ϕ− ∂RW
∂wp
,
0 =
∂IW
∂ws
− ∂IW
∂RW
∂RW
∂ws
=
∂W
∂ws
− ∂Rκ
∂ws
.
Thus, in equilibrium the change in the contributions of the employer (labor)
lobby, RΠ (RW ), due to a change in a wage equals the effect of that wage on
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the welfare of that lobby, Π (W ):
∂RΠ
∂wp
=
∂Π
∂wp
+
∂Π
∂w∗p
ϕ,
∂RΠ
∂ws
=
∂Π
∂ws
,
∂RW
∂wp
=
∂W
∂wp
+
∂W
∂w∗p
ϕ,
∂RW
∂ws
=
∂W
∂ws
.
(27)
In other words, the contribution schedules RΠ and RW are locally truthful.
This concept can be extended to a globally truthful contribution schedule
that represents the preferences of the employer (union) lobby at all policy
points (cf. Berhheim and Whinston 1986 or Dixit et al. 1994). Given (27),
this truthful contribution function takes the form
RΠ = max[Π− Π, 0], RW = max[W −W, 0], (28)
where Π (W ) is the employers (workers) rents, when the employer (union)
lobby does not pay contributions but the common agency chooses its best
response, given the contribution schedule of the union (employer) lobby.
Let wp and ws be the wages that would maximize the workers’ rents W :
(wp, ws) = arg max
(ws, wp) s.t. (24)
W.
The threat points Π and W are then determined as follows. If the em-
ployer lobby does not pay contributions to the common agency, RΠ = 0, then
the latter retaliates by increasing the wages to the level (wp, ws) set by the
monopoly union. In that case, Π
.
= Π
∣∣
(wp,ws)=(wp,ws), RΠ=0
. If the union lobby
does not pay contributions to the agency, RW = 0, then the latter retaliates
by decreasing the wages to the level of the competitive wage wm. In that case,
W
.
= W
∣∣
wp=ws=wm, RW=0
. Thus, Π and W are given for the lobbies. Given
this and (28), the common agency’s equilibrium conditions (26) become
(ws, wp) = arg max
(ws, wp) s.t. (24)
(RΠ +RW ) = arg max
(ws, wp) s.t. (24)
(Π +W ). (29)
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This result can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the common agency behaves as if it maxi-
mized total rents in the unionized sectors, W +Π, taking the foreign common
agency’s response (24) into account.
The Nash equilibrium of the lobbies in truthful strategies implements an
efficient action for the lobbies taken together (cf. Dixit et al. 1997). In
the model of this article, this means that if the unions and employers acted
together as a group, then they would maximize their total income W + Π.
7. General equilibrium effects
Because the home and foreign countries are identical and one unit of each
good i is made of one unit of labor, then, in equilibrium, it is true that
I∗ = I, w∗p = wp, w
∗
s = ws, w
∗
m = wm, ls = l
∗
s , lp = l
∗
p, lm = l
∗
m. (30)
In that equilibrium, the common agency’s equilibrium conditions (29) define
aggregate income I and sector-specific employment levels lm, ls and lp as
functions of the globalization parameters ϕ, τ , α and β (cf. Appendix B):
I(ϕ, τ, α, β), ls(ϕ, τ, α, β), lm(ϕ, τ, α, β), lp(ϕ, τ, α, β), (31)(
∂I
∂α
− ∂I
∂β
)
ϕ=1
=
∂l`
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=1
=
(
∂l`
∂α
− ∂l`
∂β
)
ϕ=1
= 0 for ` ∈ {m, s, o}, (32)
I
∣∣
ϕ=0
< I
∣∣
ϕ=1
,
∂I
∂τ
< 0, (33)
lm
∣∣
ϕ=0
> lm
∣∣
ϕ=1
,
∂lm
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=0
> 0,
(
∂lm
∂α
− ∂lm
∂β
)
ϕ=0
< 0, ls
∣∣
ϕ=0
> ls
∣∣
ϕ=1
,
∂ls
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=0
> 0,
(
∂ls
∂α
− ∂ls
∂β
)
ϕ=0
< 0, lp
∣∣
ϕ=0
< lp
∣∣
ϕ=1
,
∂lp
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=0
< 0,(
∂lp
∂α
− ∂lp
∂β
)
ϕ=0
> 0. (34)
The results (32) and (33) can be rephrased as follows:
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Proposition 2. A shift from national to international labor market regula-
tion (i.e. the increase of ϕ from 0 to 1) promotes welfare I. A decrease
in the trade cost τ increases welfare I with national (ϕ = 0), but neither it
nor opening up shielded sectors to trade (i.e. an increase in α with an equal
decrease in β) has welfare and employment effects with international labor
market regulation (ϕ = 1).
When labor market regulation is coordinated for two identical countries,
these behave as if they were a single country with no distortion from mutual
trade. This makes trade policy measures ineffective.
Differentiating the employment functions lm, ls and lp [cf. (9) and (14)]
totally and noting (34) and w∗p = wp [cf. (30)] lead to the following results:
∂wm
∂ϕ
> 0,
∂wm
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=0
< 0,
(
∂wm
∂α
− ∂wm
∂β
)
ϕ=0
> 0,
∂ws
∂ϕ
> 0,
∂ws
∂τ
∣∣∣∣
ϕ=0
< 0,(
∂ws
∂α
− ∂ws
∂β
)
ϕ=0
> 0,
∂wp
∂ϕ
< 0,
(
∂wp
∂α
− ∂wp
∂β
)
ϕ=0
< 0.
These results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3. A shift from national to international labor market regula-
tion (i.e. the increase of ϕ from 0 to 1) decreases the open-sector relative
wage (i.e. wp relative to ws and wm). Opening up shielded sectors to trade
(i.e. an increase in α with an equal decrease in β) decreases the open-sector
relative wage with national (ϕ = 0), but has no effect on wages with interna-
tional regulation (ϕ = 1).
Propositions 2 and 3 are in contrast to Kreickemeier and Meland (2013),
who, assuming monopoly unions, prove that trade cost reductions decrease
welfare. This difference can be explained as follows. In KM, a decrease
in trade costs hampers welfare, because consumption levels become more
unequal, reducing welfare through the concavity of the utility function. In
this document, the common agency limits the bargaining power of the open-
sector labor unions to ensure that the welfare losses due to high open-sector
wages do not outweigh the direct efficiency benefits from trade cost decreases.
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8. Conclusions
In this article, I examine two identical integrated countries with partially
oligopolistic sectors and labor market regulation. The lobbies of unions and
employers influence the common agency for revising labor market rules in
their favor. In the end, this determines the wages in the oligopolistic sectors.
Traditionally, globalization is examined through the general equilibrium ef-
fects of two changes: trade cost reductions and opening up shielded sectors
to trade. In this article, the international coordination of labor market regu-
lation is the third aspect of globalization. The main results are the following.
In Kreickemeier and Meland (2013), the union wages are determined by
monopoly unions which are microeconomic agents taking the competitive
wage as given. In that case, union wages are set as mark ups (or premiums)
over and above the competitive wage so that all wages change in proportion.
In this article, the level of wages is ultimately determined by the common
agencies that are macroeconomic agents. Thus, the open-sector wages can
change in the opposite direction than the other wages in the economy.
Because the Nash equilibrium of the union and employer lobbies in truth-
ful strategies implements an efficient action for them taken together, the
common agency maximizes the sum of the workers’ and employers’ rents by
wages in equilibrium. If the common agencies of the two countries behave
in Cournot manner, then the open-sector relative wages rise too high from
the welfare point of view. That distortion is eliminated, if labor market
regulation is brought to the international level.
Furthermore, Kreickemeier and Meland (2013) argue that a reduction in
trade costs decreases aggregate welfare, because monopoly unions increase
their rents too much over and above the competitive wage. In the model
of this document, the political process of labor market regulation moderates
open-sector wage increases enough to allow aggregate welfare to increase.
A decrease in trade costs improve employment in the open sectors. This
generates migration of workers from the “worse-paid” competitive sectors
to the “better-paid” open sectors, increasing competitive wages. This will
push up shielded-sector wages, so that open-sector wages will fall relative
to wages paid elsewhere in the economy. When labor market regulation is
coordinated for two identical countries, these behave as a single country with
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no distortion from mutual trade. In that case, trade cost reductions have no
effect on employment and aggregate welfare.
The evidence on declining union power with globalization in many coun-
tries (cf. section 1) can be explained by the results of this article as follows.
A decrease in trade costs and opening up shielded sectors to trade (i) weaken
labor unions in the open sectors, and simultaneously (ii) increase the pro-
portion and weight of open sectors in the economy.
Appendix A. Wage settlement
The microfoundations of labor market regulation are the following. On
the one hand, when the labor union and the employer federation alternate
in making offers to each other, they behave as if they jointly maximized a
weighed geometric average of their utilities (cf. Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky 1986, or Palokangas 2000, Ch. 1). The weight of such an average,
which reflects the relative bargaining power of the parties, depends on labor
market regulations (e.g. restrictions in starting a dispute, the intermedia-
tion of disputes). On the other hand, both the employer’s and the union’s
reference utility in wage bargaining hinges on how many of the workers can
participate in a strike.4 These things depend on labor market regulations.
Consider collective bargaining in oligopolistic sector i ∈ P ∪ S where the
labor union attempts to maximize the workers’ rents v(i) [cf. (19)], while the
employer federation attempts to maximize the employers’ rent pi(i) [cf. (18)],
both noting the labor demand function l(i) [cf. (9) or (14)], and taking all
the other wages wm, w
∗(i) and w(j) for j 6= i as given.
The common agency prevents (i) employed workers from striking.5 Then,
4Some papers assume that the expected wage outside the firm is the union’s reference
point, but this is not quite in line with the microfoundations of the alternating offers
game. Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986, pp. 177, 185-6) state that the the
reference income should not be identified with the outside option point. Rather, despite
the availability of these options, it remains appropriate to identify the reference income
with the income streams accruing to the parties in the course of the dispute. For example,
if the dispute involves a strike, these income streams are the employee’s income from
temporary work, union strike funds, and similar sources, while the employer’s income
might derive from temporary arrangements that keeps the business running.
5In many countries, there is a concept of “protection work”: the number (i) of workers
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the unions’ and employers’ reference utilities under disputes, v(i) and pi(i),
are their utilities v(i) and pi(i) with employment l(i) = (i):6
v(i)
.
= v(i)
∣∣
l(i)=(i)
, pi(i)
.
= pi(i)
∣∣
l(i)=(i)
. (A.1)
Because the employers are willing to employ more than (i) workers, then
∂pi(i)
∂(i)
=
∂pi(i)
∂l(i)
∣∣∣∣
l(i)=(i)
> 0. (A.2)
Let δ(i) be relative union bargaining power. The outcome of wage bar-
gaining is obtained by maximizing the Generalized Nash Product of the par-
ties’ utilities, Θ(i)
.
= log[v(i)−v(i)]+[1/δ(i)−1] log[pi(i)−pi(i)], by the wage
w(i), given all the other wages wm, w
∗(i) and w(j) for j 6= i. The first-order
and second-order conditions of this maximization are
∂Θ(i)
∂w(i)
=
1
v(i)− v(i)
∂v(i)
∂w(i)
+
1/δ(i)− 1
pi(i)− pi(i)
∂pi(i)
∂w(i)
= 0,
∂2Θ(i)
∂w(i)2
< 0. (A.3)
I assume that the tariff τ is small enough to yield ∂pi(i)
∂w(i)
< 0 for i ∈ P ∪ S.
Because the open and shielded sectors are identical, respectively, the com-
mon agency sets them the same relative union bargaining power, δ(i) = δp
for i ∈ P and δ(i) = δs for i ∈ S, and the same striking constraints, (i) = p
for i ∈ P and (i) = s for i ∈ S. Differentiating the first-order condition
(A.3) and noting (A.1) and (A.2), one can see that the wage is an increas-
ing function of relative union bargaining power δ(i) and the number (i) of
protection workers in each oligopolistic home sector i ∈ P ∪ S:
∂w(i)
∂δ(i)
= − ∂
2Θ`
∂w(i)∂δ(i)
/
∂2Θ`
∂w(i)2
=
δ(i)−2
pi(i)− pi(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂pi(i)
∂w(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
/
∂2Θ`
∂w(i)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0,
that is considered to be necessary to “protect” the “normal” functioning of the society. It
is, of course, a political matter to judge what is normal.
6The firm is ready to employ workers over the level (i).
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∂w˜(i)
∂(i)
= − ∂
2Θ`
∂w(i)∂(i)
/
∂2Θ`
∂w(i)2
=
1/δ(i)− 1
[pi(i)− pi(i)]2︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∂pi(i)
∂w(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
∂pi(i)
∂(i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
/
∂2Θ`
∂w(i)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
> 0.
Thus, the common agency can set the wage w(i) at any level by its policy
variables δ(i) and (i) for i ∈ P ∪ S.
Appendix B. Results (31)-(34)
From (5), (9), (14) and (17) it follows that
ls = cs =
a− ps
b
, cp =
a− pp
b
,
dps
dws
=
n
n+ 1
,
∂pp
∂wp
=
∂pp
∂w∗p
=
∂pp
∂τ
=
n
2n+ 1
,
∂wm
∂ws
= −β
γ
n
n+ 1
,
∂wm
∂wp
= −2α
γ
(n+ 1)n
2n+ 1
,
∂wm
∂w∗p
= 2
α
γ
n2
2n+ 1
,
∂wm
∂τ
= −α
γ
n
2n+ 1
,
∂wm
∂α
∣∣∣∣
dβ=−dα
=
b
γ
(lp − ls). (B.1)
Noting (21), (22) and (B.1), I define total rents:
J
.
= W + Π = α
[
(pp − wm)cp + τ n
b
(wp − w∗p)
]
+ β(ps − wm)ls
=
α
b
[
(pp − wm)(a− pp) + τn(wp − w∗p)
]
+
β
b
(ps − wm)(a− ps)
=
α
b
[
(a+ wm)pp − p2p − awm + τn(wp − w∗p)
]
+
β
b
[(a+ wm)ps − p2s − awm].
(B.2)
Given (B.1), the function (B.2) has following partial derivatives:
∂J
∂ws
=
β
b
(a+ wm − 2ps) dps
dws
+
[
α
b
(pp − a) + β
b
(ps − a)
]
∂wm
∂ws
= β
n/γ
n+ 1
[
γ(2ls − lm) + αcp + βls
]
,
(B.3)
∂J
∂wp
=
α
b
[
(a+ wm − 2pp) ∂pp
∂wp
+ τn
]
+
[
α
b
(pp − a) + β
b
(ps − a)
]
∂wm
∂wp
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=
α
γ
n
2n+ 1
[
γ(2cp − lm) + (2n+ 1)γ
b
τ + 2(n+ 1)(αcp + βls)
]
,
∂J
∂w∗p
=
α
b
[
(a+ wm − 2pp) ∂pp
∂w∗p
− τn
]
+
[
α
b
(pp − a) + β
b
(ps − a)
]
∂wm
∂w∗p
=
α
γ
n
2n+ 1
[
γ(2cp − lm)− (2n+ 1)γ
b
τ − n(αcp + βls)
]
,
(B.4)
∂J
∂wp
+ ϕ
∂J
∂w∗p
=
α
γ
n
2n+ 1
{
(1 + ϕ)γ(2cp − lm) + (1− ϕ)(2n+ 1)γ
b
τ
+ 2[(1− ϕ)n+ 1](αcp + βls)
}
, (B.5)
∂J
∂τ
=
α
b
(a+ wm − 2pp)∂pp
∂τ
+
[
α
b
(pp − a) + β
b
(ps − a)
]
∂wm
∂τ
=
α
γ
n
2n+ 1
[
γ(2cp − lm) + αcp + βlm
]
,
(B.6)
∂J
∂α
∣∣∣∣
dβ=−dα
= (pp − wm)cp + τ n
b
(wp − w∗p)− (ps − wm)ls
= (lm − lp)bcp + τ n
b
(wp − w∗p)− (lm − ls)bls − (αcp + βls)
b
γ
(lp − ls). (B.7)
Given (27) and (B.2), the first-order conditions for maximization (26) are
0 =
∂(RΠ +RW )
∂ws
=
∂(Π +W )
∂ws
=
∂J
∂ws
, (B.8)
0 =
∂(RΠ +RW )
∂wp
=
∂RΠ
∂wp
+
∂RW
∂wp
=
∂Π
∂wp
+ ϕ
∂Π
∂w∗p
+
∂W
∂wp
+ ϕ
∂W
∂w∗p
=
∂(Π +W )
∂wp
+
∂(Π +W )
∂w∗p
ϕ =
∂J
∂wp
+ ϕ
∂J
∂w∗p
. (B.9)
I assume that the second-order condition holds for ϕ ∈ {0, 1}.
Because the countries are identical, w∗p = wp and cp = lp hold true in
equilibrium [cf. (30)]. Inserting these, (B.3) and (B.5) into the first-order
conditions (B.8) and (B.9), I obtain the equations
0 = αlp + βls + γ(2ls − lm), (B.10)
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0 = 2[(1− ϕ)n+ 1](αlp + βls) + (1 + ϕ)γ(2lp − lm) + (1− ϕ)(2n+ 1)γτ/b.
(B.11)
From (B.10), (B.11) and 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 it follows that
ls − lm/2 = −(αlp + βls)/2 < 0,
lp − ls = lm
2
− ls − (1− ϕ)n+ 1
(1 + ϕ)γ
(αlp + βls)− (1− ϕ)
(
n+
1
2
)
τ
b
=
[
1
2
− (1− ϕ)n+ 1
(1 + ϕ)γ
]
(αlp + βls)− (1− ϕ)
(
n+
1
2
)
τ
b
,
(lp − ls)ϕ<1 =
[
1
2
− (1− ϕ)n+ 1
(1 + ϕ)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
> 1
2
]
(αlp + βls︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
)− (1− ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
(
n+
1
2
)
τ
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0,
(lp − ls)ϕ=1 = 0, (B.12)
lp ≤ ls < lm
2
, L =
∫ 1
0
l(i)di > min
i∈[0,1]
l(i) = lp. (B.13)
Noting (B.6), (B.9), (B.10), (B.13), w∗p = wp and cp = lp [cf. (30)], I obtain
∂J
∂τ
=
α
γ
n
2n+ 1
[
γ(2lp − lm) + αcp + βlm
]
, (B.14)
∂J
∂α
= (lm − lp)blp − (lm − ls)bls − (αlp + βls) b
γ
(lp − ls), (B.15)
∂J
∂wp
+
∂J
∂w∗p
= (1− ϕ) ∂J
∂w∗p
=
α
γ
n
2n+ 1
(1− ϕ)
[
γ(2cp − lm)− (2n+ 1)γ
b
τ − n(αcp + βls)
]
.
(B.16)
Noting w∗p = wp, (B.2) and (B.8), the determination of income, (20), and the
full-employment constraint (16) take the form:
0 = α(a− blp)lp + β(a− bls)ls + γ(a− blm)lm − I, (B.17)
0 = αlp + βls + γlm − L. (B.18)
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The system of four equations, (B.17), (B.18), (B.10) and (B.11), has four
unknown variables – income I and employment levels lm, ls and lp – and four
parameters ϕ, τ , α and β. Differentiating this system totally yields

−1 γ(a− 2blm) β(a− 2bls) α(a− 2blp)
0 γ β α
0 −γ β + 2γ α
0 −(1 + ϕ)γ 2β[(1− ϕ)n+ 1] 2α[(1−ϕ)n+1]
+2(1+ϕ)γ


dI
dlm
dls
dlp

+

0 0 [a−b(lp+ls)]
(lp−ls)
0 0 lp − ls
0 0 lp − ls
ϑ (1− ϕ)(2n+ 1)γ
b
2[(1−ϕ)n+1]
(lp−ls)


dϕ
dτ
dα− dβ
 = 0, (B.19)
where, by (B.13), it holds true that
ϑ
.
= γ(2lp − lm︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)− 2ϕ(αlp + βls)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
− (2n+ 1)γ
b
τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
< 0. (B.20)
The Jacobian of this system is
K = −2γ2{2α[(1− ϕ)n+ 1] + 2(1 + ϕ)γ + (2β + α)(1 + ϕ)} < 0. (B.21)
Noting (B.12) and (B.13), the matrix equation (B.19) can be written in terms
of partial derivatives:
∂I
∂ϕ
=
4
K︸︷︷︸
−
b ϑ︸︷︷︸
−
αγ[γ(lm − lp︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) + β(ls − lp︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)] > 0, (B.22)
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∂I
∂τ
=
4
K︸︷︷︸
−
b (1− ϕ)(2n+ 1)γ
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
αγ[γ(lm − lp︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
) + β(ls − lp︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)]
{
= 0 ⇔ ϕ = 1,
< 0 ⇔ ϕ < 1,
∂I
∂α
− ∂I
∂β
= 2
γ2
K
(lp − ls)b
{
(1 + ϕ)
[
γ(lp + ls − 2lm) + 2β(lp − ls)
]
+ α(ls − lp)
[
(1− ϕ)n+ 1 + (1 + ϕ)
(
1
2
+
β
α
)]}
= 0 ⇔ lp = ls ⇔ ϕ = 1,
∂lm
∂ϕ
= −2γα 1
K︸︷︷︸
−
ϑ︸︷︷︸
−
< 0, (B.23)
∂lm
∂τ
= −2γα 1
K︸︷︷︸
−
(2n+ 1)
γ
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(1− ϕ)
{
= 0 ⇔ ϕ = 1,
> 0 ⇔ ϕ < 1,
∂lm
∂α
− ∂lm
∂β
= 4γ2(1 + ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(lp − ls) 1
K︸︷︷︸
−
{
= 0 ⇔ l0 = ls ⇔ ϕ = 1,
> 0 ⇔ l0 < ls ⇔ ϕ < 1,
∂ls
∂ϕ
= −2γα 1
K︸︷︷︸
−
ϑ︸︷︷︸
−
< 0, (B.24)
∂ls
∂τ
= −2γα 1
K︸︷︷︸
−
(2n+ 1)
γ
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(1− ϕ)
{
= 0 ⇔ ϕ = 1,
> 0 ⇔ ϕ < 1,
∂ls
∂α
− ∂ls
∂β
= 4γ
1
K︸︷︷︸
−
(lp − ls)(1 + ϕ)γ
{
= 0 ⇔ l0 = ls ⇔ ϕ = 1,
> 0 ⇔ l0 < ls ⇔ ϕ < 1,
∂lp
∂ϕ
=
γ
K︸︷︷︸
−
ϑ︸︷︷︸
−
(2γ + β) > 0, (B.25)
∂lp
∂τ
= 2
γ
K︸︷︷︸
−
(2n+ 1)
γ
b︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
(γ + β)(1− ϕ)
{
= 0 ⇔ ϕ = 1,
< 0 ⇔ ϕ < 1,
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∂lp
∂α
− ∂lp
∂β
= 2
γ
K︸︷︷︸
−
(lp − ls︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
)
{
2γ[(1− ϕ)n+ 1] + 1 + ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
}{ = 0 ⇔ ϕ = 1,
> 0 ⇔ ϕ < 1.
Because (B.22)-(B.25) hold for ϕ ∈ [0, 1], then I∣∣
ϕ=0
< I
∣∣
ϕ=1
, lm
∣∣
ϕ=0
> lm
∣∣
ϕ=1
,
ls
∣∣
ϕ=0
> ls
∣∣
ϕ=1
and lp
∣∣
ϕ=0
< lp
∣∣
ϕ=1
hold true by the mean value theorem.
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